A clandestine plan to clear out mangroves has been discovered by a visiting team of environmentalists. It is alleged that, once cleared out, the land near Ibrahim Hyderi and Gizri will be put to commercial use.
The Pakistan Fisherfolk Forum (PFF) have hurled allegations at the Defence Housing Authority (DHA) officials, saying that the area comes under the jurisdiction of the DHA.
A large number of people have been hired by the agents of the influential timber mafia to cut the endangered mangroves from inside the forests and they have destroyed wide expanses of mangroves from the inside of the forest, alleged a PFF spokesman while talking to The News. However, he said, this clever eradication of flora is not obvious from the outside.
The Sindh forest department had deployed officials near Rehri, a fishermen locality, to keep strict vigil over the move, but the officials have allegedly joined hands with the mafia to wipe out the mangroves.
When contacted, the local forest department officials claimed that they were there to impose fines against those caught red-handed. However, the situation observed by the visiting team reveals that influential officials, local sea lords and certain government bodies have initiated a joint move to clean the forest area, leaving millions of the city’s inhabitants vulnerable to natural calamities.
“When we entered the mangroves forest on boat we saw the horrible sight of trees being chopped down. People who introduced themselves to us as labourers on daily wages were axing live trees openly without any fear,” said Abdullah Khoso, who is conducting a study on mangroves and keeping an eye over the destruction of thick forests.
“It needs proper attention nobody can calculate how much area these people have already cleared. Each labourer is being paid Rs200 daily wages for the work,” added Khoso.
The concerned traders take the wood cutters to the forests on boat in the morning and pick them up in the evening. Timber is being transported by boats to the seashore where trucks and tractor trolleys are loaded with the ill-gotten cargo. This is an organised move and environmentalists have been unable to take notice of this up until now.
Though the activity takes place in broad day light, civic authorities as well as environmentalists are silent over the issue. It is unfortunate that the institutions made to safeguard the people and the natural resources of the country are completely dysfunctional and are destroying everything around there, the PFF spokesman added.
Mangroves are a sanctuary for shrimps, crabs, fish and a wide array of birds. The thick mangroves forests are now under extreme pressure due to lack of fresh water in the Indus Delta, coupled with the discharge of untreated effluents from industries and sewage from city. The increased demand for timber for fuel and other uses is also threatening the mangroves.
However, the present government has been seen to be reluctant to take immediate steps to stop the mass destruction of mangroves.
http://www.thenews.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=123624
Friday, August 15, 2008
Sunday, May 18, 2008
Beyond enemy waters
Detained fishermen are languishing for nothing, says Abdullah Khoso
On October 11 2008, seven Indians arrived at Karachi’s Jinah Terminal Airport. The government of Gujrat, India, on behalf of Indian boat owners, had sent these men to recover confiscated boats – the poor Indian fishermen who used them now being in Pakistani jails. The purpose of the delegation was to survey the conditions of the confiscated boats for possible auction. Yet, they also brought with them letters from family members, for their loved ones now behind bars. “I will be looked on with suspicion if we are not successful in meeting with machawara (fishers),” Bharat Modi, a member of the delegate, confessed. “When I was leaving the village for the airport, to travel to Karachi, hundreds of fisherwomen gathered at my home, all wanting me to give messages to their relatives.”
According to Modi, 434 Indian fishermen now languish in Pakistani jails, almost all of them from the small village of Wanak Bara in District Diu of Gujrat, India. “There are mostly women left in the village,” Modi said. “All their men are in Pakistani jails.” And it’s not just the men. The boats they used – some 326 of them – were taken into the possession of Pakistani authorities. Of these, 186 boats have already been auctioned in Pakistani markets. On the other side of the border, a similar syndrome is in effect, though in lesser numbers. Official records list eight Pakistani fishermen in Indian jails, but the unofficial count is 55, said Veligi Masani, the leader of the Indian delegation. Eighty-seven Pakistani boats are also held by the Indian government.
Although the Indian Delegation was denied access to the detained fishermen – they did not have prior authorisation from the Sindh government -- these arrests are nothing new. Since 1987, both Pakistani and Indian authorities – the MSA in Pakistan, and the Coast Guard, Border Security Force, and the Indian Navy in India – have been arresting each other’s fishermen and confiscating their boats in the Arabian Sea. A total of 4,516 Indian fishers, with 729 boars, have been apprehended by Pakistan over the last 20 years, according to a 2008 study by the Pakistan Fisherfolk Forum (PFF), a grassroots organisation that represents fishermen’s rights.
The rationale behind the arrests borders on ludicrous. The coast guards of the two rival nations officially consider the fishermen as spies or smugglers infringing on their sovereign waters. And so when fishermen unintentionally drift into “enemy” waters – due to engine failure or high tides, or because they are unable to find fish closer to home – they are picked up. But without any form of demarcation, it is difficult for fishermen to gauge exactly where the borders actually lie. What’s more, according to PFF, more often than not, fishermen are arrested even when they are within their country’s territorial boundaries. “Fishers usually do not cross borders, but security agencies violate international maritime laws and take fishers from the fishers’ own home waters,” said Gulab Shah, a fisher folk representative in Thatta District. “They bring more fishers for detention just to show their performance,” he added.
Fisher families maintain that illegal profit-making is also at work. On both sides of the border, agencies impound fishing equipment, fish and boats, often worth more than six or seven lakh, and then sell these in the market. In an ironic twist, the money gained from the sales is shared between Indian and Pakistan coast guard authorities.
In one of the more recent detentions, eight Pakistani fishers were captured in August 2008, and are now being held in Bhej Jail, Gujrat. Among those arrested was a 10-year-old boy. Days later, a 13-year-old boy, along with four other fishermen, were detained. On October 31, the Indian Coast Guard seized a Pakistani boat carrying seven crewmembers near Kajhar Creek, within Pakistani territorial limits.
On both sides of border, heart-wrenching stories abound. Many of those detained are the sole breadwinner in their family, yet it sometimes takes years for families to discover what happened to their husbands, brothers and sons. Janat, a resident of Rehri Goth, a coastal village of Karachi, did not know what happened to her husband, Achar, for four years, finally learning of his fate from a letter he sent from prison. Achar was arrested 15 years ago, and remains in an Indian prison today. The verdict, reached in 2006, was narcotics smuggling, Achar wrote in a letter to his wife. It took the Indian justice system 13 years to bring the case to court.
Achar’s mother, Mai Asi, 90, can only pray that she will be able to see Achar and his brother, who was also arrested 15 years ago, again. “One day Allah will send me back my children, she said with tears rolling down her wrinkled cheeks. “What can I do but pray for their safety and long life?” Mai Asi’s husband died of shock after he learnt of his two sons’ arrests, Janat, Achar’s wife, said.
On May 10 1999, Usman Sacho, Nawaz, Usman Ali and Zaman Khan, all of Karochan, Thatta District, went fishing and did not return. Five years later, in 2004, Usman Sacho’s family received a letter from Usman, telling them that the four men were alive and detained in Sabir Matti Jail in Ahmedabad, Gujrat under charges of smuggling. In his letter, Usman wrote, “We get very little to eat. Even our enemies should not have to stay in such a jail.”
A PFF representative, speaking on the condition of anonymity, said that jail conditions were poor and justice slow or nonexistent for fishers. With no one to pursue or support their cases, the fisher folk are a low priority. And, the representative said, “if anyone tries to approach or help them, he is looked on suspiciously and considered a spy.”
Another representative of PFF admitted that working for the detained fishermen was an onerous task. “Disclosing news about Indian fishers arrested by Pakistani agencies is not a big deal,” he said. “The problem arises when the media publishes news of Pakistani fishers arrested by Indian agencies quoting PFF as a source.” The office’s phones start ringing non-stop with intelligence officers interrogating them over the phone, he said, adding that PFF was threatened to reveal their sources. “Our answer remains the same, we learnt it through the internet and their [the captured men’s] fellow fishers.”
According to PFF, Indian and Pakistani forces have killed18 Pakistani and four Indian fishermen, respectively, over the last 18 years. Yet, there are simple solutions that could put an end to this tragic and unnecessary waste of life. That disenfranchised fishermen should be killed or held for years in prison without charge is a humanitarian atrocity, and more must be done to protect the civil rights of fishing communities, both in India and in Pakistan.
At the very least, a mechanism through which information can be passed in a timely manner to effected families must be put in place. Better, the families should be provided with economic relief. Each country must also improve their management of fisheries within their Economic Exclusive Zone to reduce pressure on fishermen to cross the border in search of a better catch. A bilateral solution must be reached. Abdullah Khoso lives in Karachi
This article published in The Friday Times. Fri, 12/05/2008.
On October 11 2008, seven Indians arrived at Karachi’s Jinah Terminal Airport. The government of Gujrat, India, on behalf of Indian boat owners, had sent these men to recover confiscated boats – the poor Indian fishermen who used them now being in Pakistani jails. The purpose of the delegation was to survey the conditions of the confiscated boats for possible auction. Yet, they also brought with them letters from family members, for their loved ones now behind bars. “I will be looked on with suspicion if we are not successful in meeting with machawara (fishers),” Bharat Modi, a member of the delegate, confessed. “When I was leaving the village for the airport, to travel to Karachi, hundreds of fisherwomen gathered at my home, all wanting me to give messages to their relatives.”
According to Modi, 434 Indian fishermen now languish in Pakistani jails, almost all of them from the small village of Wanak Bara in District Diu of Gujrat, India. “There are mostly women left in the village,” Modi said. “All their men are in Pakistani jails.” And it’s not just the men. The boats they used – some 326 of them – were taken into the possession of Pakistani authorities. Of these, 186 boats have already been auctioned in Pakistani markets. On the other side of the border, a similar syndrome is in effect, though in lesser numbers. Official records list eight Pakistani fishermen in Indian jails, but the unofficial count is 55, said Veligi Masani, the leader of the Indian delegation. Eighty-seven Pakistani boats are also held by the Indian government.
Although the Indian Delegation was denied access to the detained fishermen – they did not have prior authorisation from the Sindh government -- these arrests are nothing new. Since 1987, both Pakistani and Indian authorities – the MSA in Pakistan, and the Coast Guard, Border Security Force, and the Indian Navy in India – have been arresting each other’s fishermen and confiscating their boats in the Arabian Sea. A total of 4,516 Indian fishers, with 729 boars, have been apprehended by Pakistan over the last 20 years, according to a 2008 study by the Pakistan Fisherfolk Forum (PFF), a grassroots organisation that represents fishermen’s rights.
The rationale behind the arrests borders on ludicrous. The coast guards of the two rival nations officially consider the fishermen as spies or smugglers infringing on their sovereign waters. And so when fishermen unintentionally drift into “enemy” waters – due to engine failure or high tides, or because they are unable to find fish closer to home – they are picked up. But without any form of demarcation, it is difficult for fishermen to gauge exactly where the borders actually lie. What’s more, according to PFF, more often than not, fishermen are arrested even when they are within their country’s territorial boundaries. “Fishers usually do not cross borders, but security agencies violate international maritime laws and take fishers from the fishers’ own home waters,” said Gulab Shah, a fisher folk representative in Thatta District. “They bring more fishers for detention just to show their performance,” he added.
Fisher families maintain that illegal profit-making is also at work. On both sides of the border, agencies impound fishing equipment, fish and boats, often worth more than six or seven lakh, and then sell these in the market. In an ironic twist, the money gained from the sales is shared between Indian and Pakistan coast guard authorities.
In one of the more recent detentions, eight Pakistani fishers were captured in August 2008, and are now being held in Bhej Jail, Gujrat. Among those arrested was a 10-year-old boy. Days later, a 13-year-old boy, along with four other fishermen, were detained. On October 31, the Indian Coast Guard seized a Pakistani boat carrying seven crewmembers near Kajhar Creek, within Pakistani territorial limits.
On both sides of border, heart-wrenching stories abound. Many of those detained are the sole breadwinner in their family, yet it sometimes takes years for families to discover what happened to their husbands, brothers and sons. Janat, a resident of Rehri Goth, a coastal village of Karachi, did not know what happened to her husband, Achar, for four years, finally learning of his fate from a letter he sent from prison. Achar was arrested 15 years ago, and remains in an Indian prison today. The verdict, reached in 2006, was narcotics smuggling, Achar wrote in a letter to his wife. It took the Indian justice system 13 years to bring the case to court.
Achar’s mother, Mai Asi, 90, can only pray that she will be able to see Achar and his brother, who was also arrested 15 years ago, again. “One day Allah will send me back my children, she said with tears rolling down her wrinkled cheeks. “What can I do but pray for their safety and long life?” Mai Asi’s husband died of shock after he learnt of his two sons’ arrests, Janat, Achar’s wife, said.
On May 10 1999, Usman Sacho, Nawaz, Usman Ali and Zaman Khan, all of Karochan, Thatta District, went fishing and did not return. Five years later, in 2004, Usman Sacho’s family received a letter from Usman, telling them that the four men were alive and detained in Sabir Matti Jail in Ahmedabad, Gujrat under charges of smuggling. In his letter, Usman wrote, “We get very little to eat. Even our enemies should not have to stay in such a jail.”
A PFF representative, speaking on the condition of anonymity, said that jail conditions were poor and justice slow or nonexistent for fishers. With no one to pursue or support their cases, the fisher folk are a low priority. And, the representative said, “if anyone tries to approach or help them, he is looked on suspiciously and considered a spy.”
Another representative of PFF admitted that working for the detained fishermen was an onerous task. “Disclosing news about Indian fishers arrested by Pakistani agencies is not a big deal,” he said. “The problem arises when the media publishes news of Pakistani fishers arrested by Indian agencies quoting PFF as a source.” The office’s phones start ringing non-stop with intelligence officers interrogating them over the phone, he said, adding that PFF was threatened to reveal their sources. “Our answer remains the same, we learnt it through the internet and their [the captured men’s] fellow fishers.”
According to PFF, Indian and Pakistani forces have killed18 Pakistani and four Indian fishermen, respectively, over the last 18 years. Yet, there are simple solutions that could put an end to this tragic and unnecessary waste of life. That disenfranchised fishermen should be killed or held for years in prison without charge is a humanitarian atrocity, and more must be done to protect the civil rights of fishing communities, both in India and in Pakistan.
At the very least, a mechanism through which information can be passed in a timely manner to effected families must be put in place. Better, the families should be provided with economic relief. Each country must also improve their management of fisheries within their Economic Exclusive Zone to reduce pressure on fishermen to cross the border in search of a better catch. A bilateral solution must be reached. Abdullah Khoso lives in Karachi
This article published in The Friday Times. Fri, 12/05/2008.
Sunday, February 10, 2008
This research is written for the general public, however, the motive behind this research is to make aware the students of the media and human rights activists about the freedom of the Pakistani Press. The Press in Pakistan avoids indulging itself in a risk situation by representing the minority and also reporting injustice against minority religious groups as a common attitude of society.
Communicating risk: majority and minority in the media text
On October 2005, in Pakistan, during morning prayers, two motorcyclists had attacked on Ahmadis’ place of worship, killed eight and inured fourteen people. this and the attacks before this on the Ahmadis place of worship are examined through the lenses of social and legal discourse frameworks of Pakistani society which place the Ahmadis in a risky position, and they are believed to be threat to Pakistani social and religious values. The Ahmadis are a religious minority in Pakistan and follower of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad who declared himself, the Imam and the prophet. In this respect, in 1974 the government of Pakistan declared them non-Muslims and heretical by amending the constitution of the country. In 1984, the Tuheen-e-Risalat (blasphemy) law was introduced for the Ahmadis. These laws are an outcome of the influence of the majority ruling Sunni-Muslim groups.
This October incident has been reported in local, national and international newspapers. The language of these reports is different from each other due to different geographic and socio-cultural set ups.
The two newspapers, the Dawn and the Nawa-i-Waqt, published from Pakistan have reported the incident in the social, cultural and the legal limitations: crossing these limitations is risk to these media outlets. The Pakistani media works as a bardic of the majority, the majority that controls power of the state. It represents majority as ‘us’ and minority as ‘the others’. The constitution of the country and other blasphemy laws work as taboo for the each individual at anywhere whether he or she works in the media or somewhere else. The day-to-day execution of Ahmadis is open threat to all who takes chance to represent Ahmadis as Muslims. the media if is out of the premises of Pakistan, for example, the BBC, it represents differently, whether it is the majority or minority, these both groups are portrayed as ‘the others’ because the BBC is not bound to any Pakistani legal and socio-cultural restrictions.
When the BBC represents two binary religious groups, the minority Ahmadis and majority Sunni, in Pakistan, its language of representation is mild for the victims and hard for the attackers and their religion. Sunni Muslims are represented as the terrorists and so their religion and Ahmadis are placed in a victimized position. It shows that Ahmadis are a peaceful community and have not crossed the boundaries of society demarcated by the majority ruling Sunni group. In the BBC, Ahmadis are Muslims and their place of worship is a mosque. According to the Laws in Pakistan, it is blasphemy if a Ahmadi call him/herself a Muslim and term his/her place of worship a mosque. Not only this but there are so many other taboos practiced against Ahmadis which bare Ahmadis be looking like Muslims. This is why the Dawn and Nawai-i-Waqt newspaper published from Pakistan have avoided using the language, which could show that Ahmadis are Muslims and their place of worship is a mosque. These newspapers see the Ahmadis in a similar way as the majority Sunni Muslim group.
By these activities and incidents, the media persons and human rights activists all over the world may suppose that the media in Pakistan has not come out of the clutches of the existing radical thoughts, which are believed to be anti-human, liberal and progressive thoughts. On the one hand, these activities show that the constitution of the country is made up of contrary regulations; it offers freedom to all to practice their religions and on the other, it does not allow few to practicing their religions.
In addition, this is a matter of great concern because the media seems as a part of the radical thoughts, and if not, but it is at least confined to the rules and regulations which stop the media to debate the issue and lead the society towards reforms. Reforming the country would not be easier until all the stakeholders of the society take initiative to remove the problems, which are hurdle in the progress of the country.
The Pakistani media communicates the incident according to the dominant discourse constructed by the majority. They might speak from a position of assumed consensus on other issues but in this particular case reflection of the cracks and inconsistencies may be risky for the media as it is for the Ahmadis.
according to Schroeder and Philips, communicate the message of the real originator (the audience) of the culture in which these are both located: “both functions under a cultural logic that obliges them to speak from a position of assumed consensus, but also to reflect the cracks and inconsistencies that may appear in that consensus” (p. 40).
Schroeder and Philips write that the appeal of bardic theory in defining “the relationship between the media and audience lies in its accentuation of the mutuality between media and citizens in the collective construction of the culture's discursive universe, and its exclusion of simple power and causal relationships” (p. 40). Mythen (2004: 77) also claims that the "[m]anufactured risks...are described as a 'pure media events' which serve to orchestrate public dialogue". He assumes that the media are a discursive place "in which political contestation about risk take places". Here Mythen supports Becks and Douglas' idea that risk has invariably been taken as a political issue.
Briefly, the concept of risk associated with the Ahmadi phenomenon has not been directly represented. It is not shown that the Ahmadis are a danger to the integration of the state. However, these are. In representing risks from the Ahmadis cultural and religious aspects are dominant over the Pakistani media’s own choice in representing ‘the others’. The Ahmadis are clearly represented as ‘the others’. In this case, the Pakistani media perform as bards of the Sunni Muslim culture in that they are powerless in addressing the issue in the way that outsiders (the BBC) can perform boldly. The BBC has represented the Ahmadis and radical Muslims in its own position, and is independent of any influence of power that works in Pakistan. In addition, the BBC cannot be the bard of Pakistani culture, because few people read the BBC news at its website and listen its programme in English in Pakistan. It is not a part of the culture; it cannot perform the role that the Pakistani media in Pakistan perform.
The intrinsic importance of the incident lies in the system where fixed terminologies are used to set apart one entity (us) from another (others). The news is formatted through specific sets of social and legal rules. In an anthropological sense, the response to risk is not atomized and individual but rather collective and cultural. The news reports in the Dawn and NW are a reflection of a social and ideological practice, or in other words a discourse that represents social facts within the frameworks of society. The formation of the language, according to given conditions and frameworks, supports the idea that the news reporting is greatly under the influence of current social and ideological processes. The neutrality of the language use is at stake. Also controlling those processes which are shown in these particular cases is not viable, because the dominant social behaviour rules over the process of news formation.
Thus, from an anthropological perspective, the formation of the perception of risk posed by ‘the others’ is collective rather individual. It is neither an issue of a few groups nor the problem of representing Ahmadis as ‘the others’ in the media, rather it is an issue of the common discourse of hatred against 'the others' (Ahmadis) which is being injected into the veins of the society. In order to eradicate such perceptions, people in Pakistan need rigorous efforts. There is also a responsibility of the state to allow the media to start a debate on the freedom of belief and practices.
The generalization of assumptions is very crucial point for this study, inasmuch as the size of sample is too small to see its implications with the media practices as whole, but it has a wider context, and in its contextual analysis some other news stories and facts are being presented to justify the generalization of certain risk assumptions.
Communicating risk: majority and minority in the media text
On October 2005, in Pakistan, during morning prayers, two motorcyclists had attacked on Ahmadis’ place of worship, killed eight and inured fourteen people. this and the attacks before this on the Ahmadis place of worship are examined through the lenses of social and legal discourse frameworks of Pakistani society which place the Ahmadis in a risky position, and they are believed to be threat to Pakistani social and religious values. The Ahmadis are a religious minority in Pakistan and follower of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad who declared himself, the Imam and the prophet. In this respect, in 1974 the government of Pakistan declared them non-Muslims and heretical by amending the constitution of the country. In 1984, the Tuheen-e-Risalat (blasphemy) law was introduced for the Ahmadis. These laws are an outcome of the influence of the majority ruling Sunni-Muslim groups.
This October incident has been reported in local, national and international newspapers. The language of these reports is different from each other due to different geographic and socio-cultural set ups.
The two newspapers, the Dawn and the Nawa-i-Waqt, published from Pakistan have reported the incident in the social, cultural and the legal limitations: crossing these limitations is risk to these media outlets. The Pakistani media works as a bardic of the majority, the majority that controls power of the state. It represents majority as ‘us’ and minority as ‘the others’. The constitution of the country and other blasphemy laws work as taboo for the each individual at anywhere whether he or she works in the media or somewhere else. The day-to-day execution of Ahmadis is open threat to all who takes chance to represent Ahmadis as Muslims. the media if is out of the premises of Pakistan, for example, the BBC, it represents differently, whether it is the majority or minority, these both groups are portrayed as ‘the others’ because the BBC is not bound to any Pakistani legal and socio-cultural restrictions.
When the BBC represents two binary religious groups, the minority Ahmadis and majority Sunni, in Pakistan, its language of representation is mild for the victims and hard for the attackers and their religion. Sunni Muslims are represented as the terrorists and so their religion and Ahmadis are placed in a victimized position. It shows that Ahmadis are a peaceful community and have not crossed the boundaries of society demarcated by the majority ruling Sunni group. In the BBC, Ahmadis are Muslims and their place of worship is a mosque. According to the Laws in Pakistan, it is blasphemy if a Ahmadi call him/herself a Muslim and term his/her place of worship a mosque. Not only this but there are so many other taboos practiced against Ahmadis which bare Ahmadis be looking like Muslims. This is why the Dawn and Nawai-i-Waqt newspaper published from Pakistan have avoided using the language, which could show that Ahmadis are Muslims and their place of worship is a mosque. These newspapers see the Ahmadis in a similar way as the majority Sunni Muslim group.
By these activities and incidents, the media persons and human rights activists all over the world may suppose that the media in Pakistan has not come out of the clutches of the existing radical thoughts, which are believed to be anti-human, liberal and progressive thoughts. On the one hand, these activities show that the constitution of the country is made up of contrary regulations; it offers freedom to all to practice their religions and on the other, it does not allow few to practicing their religions.
In addition, this is a matter of great concern because the media seems as a part of the radical thoughts, and if not, but it is at least confined to the rules and regulations which stop the media to debate the issue and lead the society towards reforms. Reforming the country would not be easier until all the stakeholders of the society take initiative to remove the problems, which are hurdle in the progress of the country.
The Pakistani media communicates the incident according to the dominant discourse constructed by the majority. They might speak from a position of assumed consensus on other issues but in this particular case reflection of the cracks and inconsistencies may be risky for the media as it is for the Ahmadis.
according to Schroeder and Philips, communicate the message of the real originator (the audience) of the culture in which these are both located: “both functions under a cultural logic that obliges them to speak from a position of assumed consensus, but also to reflect the cracks and inconsistencies that may appear in that consensus” (p. 40).
Schroeder and Philips write that the appeal of bardic theory in defining “the relationship between the media and audience lies in its accentuation of the mutuality between media and citizens in the collective construction of the culture's discursive universe, and its exclusion of simple power and causal relationships” (p. 40). Mythen (2004: 77) also claims that the "[m]anufactured risks...are described as a 'pure media events' which serve to orchestrate public dialogue". He assumes that the media are a discursive place "in which political contestation about risk take places". Here Mythen supports Becks and Douglas' idea that risk has invariably been taken as a political issue.
Briefly, the concept of risk associated with the Ahmadi phenomenon has not been directly represented. It is not shown that the Ahmadis are a danger to the integration of the state. However, these are. In representing risks from the Ahmadis cultural and religious aspects are dominant over the Pakistani media’s own choice in representing ‘the others’. The Ahmadis are clearly represented as ‘the others’. In this case, the Pakistani media perform as bards of the Sunni Muslim culture in that they are powerless in addressing the issue in the way that outsiders (the BBC) can perform boldly. The BBC has represented the Ahmadis and radical Muslims in its own position, and is independent of any influence of power that works in Pakistan. In addition, the BBC cannot be the bard of Pakistani culture, because few people read the BBC news at its website and listen its programme in English in Pakistan. It is not a part of the culture; it cannot perform the role that the Pakistani media in Pakistan perform.
The intrinsic importance of the incident lies in the system where fixed terminologies are used to set apart one entity (us) from another (others). The news is formatted through specific sets of social and legal rules. In an anthropological sense, the response to risk is not atomized and individual but rather collective and cultural. The news reports in the Dawn and NW are a reflection of a social and ideological practice, or in other words a discourse that represents social facts within the frameworks of society. The formation of the language, according to given conditions and frameworks, supports the idea that the news reporting is greatly under the influence of current social and ideological processes. The neutrality of the language use is at stake. Also controlling those processes which are shown in these particular cases is not viable, because the dominant social behaviour rules over the process of news formation.
Thus, from an anthropological perspective, the formation of the perception of risk posed by ‘the others’ is collective rather individual. It is neither an issue of a few groups nor the problem of representing Ahmadis as ‘the others’ in the media, rather it is an issue of the common discourse of hatred against 'the others' (Ahmadis) which is being injected into the veins of the society. In order to eradicate such perceptions, people in Pakistan need rigorous efforts. There is also a responsibility of the state to allow the media to start a debate on the freedom of belief and practices.
The generalization of assumptions is very crucial point for this study, inasmuch as the size of sample is too small to see its implications with the media practices as whole, but it has a wider context, and in its contextual analysis some other news stories and facts are being presented to justify the generalization of certain risk assumptions.
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